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Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Detailed Information
- 자료유형
- 기사
- ISSN
- 00028282
- 저자명
- Hamman, J.R.
- 서명/저자
- Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship / Hamman, J.R. , Loewenstein, G. , Weber, R.A
- 발행사항
- Cambridge : American Economic Assn, 2010.
- 형태사항
- pp. 1826-1846
- 주기사항
- Includes Bibliography(참고문헌수록)
- 기타저자
- Loewenstein, G.
- 기타저자
- Weber, R.A
- 원문정보
- url
- 모체레코드
- 모체정보확인
- Control Number
- kjul:60236391
MARC
008191018s2010 ai aa eng■022 ▼a00028282
■1001 ▼aHamman, J.R.
■24510▼aSelf-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship▼dHamman, J.R.▼eLoewenstein, G.▼eWeber, R.A
■260 ▼aCambridge▼bAmerican Economic Assn▼c2010.
■300 ▼app. 1826-1846
■500 ▼aIncludes Bibliography(참고문헌수록)
■7001 ▼aLoewenstein, G.
■7001 ▼aWeber, R.A
■773 ▼tThe American Economic Review▼gVol. 100 No. 4 (2010. 9)▼d2010, 09
■856 ▼uhttps://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer
■SIS ▼aS056952▼b60077322▼h8▼s2▼fP
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