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Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Detailed Information
- 자료유형
- 기사
- ISSN
- 00028282
- 저자명
- Sliwka, D.
- 서명/저자
- Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes / Sliwka, D.
- 발행사항
- Cambridge : American Economic Assn, 2007.
- 형태사항
- pp. 999-1012
- 주기사항
- 권말 참고문헌 있음
- 원문정보
- url
- 모체레코드
- 모체정보확인
- Control Number
- kjul:60231191
MARC
008190903s2007 ai aa eng■022 ▼a00028282
■1001 ▼aSliwka, D.
■24510▼aTrust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes▼dSliwka, D.
■260 ▼aCambridge▼bAmerican Economic Assn▼c2007.
■300 ▼app. 999-1012
■500 ▼a권말 참고문헌 있음
■773 ▼tThe American Economic Review▼gVol. 97 No. 3 (2007. 6)▼d2007, 06
■856 ▼uhttps://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer
■SIS ▼aS043367▼b60077322▼h8▼s1▼fP
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