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Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts
Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts
Detailed Information
- 자료유형
- 기사
- ISSN
- 00014826
- 저자명
- Core, J. E.
- 서명/저자
- Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts / Core, J. E. , Guay, W. R. , Verrecchia, R. E.
- 발행사항
- Sarasota : American Accounting Assn, 2003.
- 형태사항
- pp. 957
- 주기사항
- Includes Bibliography
- 기타저자
- Guay, W. R.
- 기타저자
- Verrecchia, R. E.
- 원문정보
- url
- 모체레코드
- 모체정보확인
- Control Number
- kjul:60229090
MARC
008190716s2003 ai aa eng■022 ▼a00014826
■1001 ▼aCore, J. E.
■24510▼aPrice versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts▼dCore, J. E.▼eGuay, W. R.▼eVerrecchia, R. E.
■260 ▼aSarasota▼bAmerican Accounting Assn▼c2003.
■300 ▼app. 957
■500 ▼aIncludes Bibliography
■7001 ▼aGuay, W. R.
■7001 ▼aVerrecchia, R. E.
■773 ▼tThe Accounting review.▼gVOL. 78 No. 4 (2003 10)▼d2003, 10
■856 ▼uhttp://aaahq.org/ic
owse.htm
■SIS ▼aS028318▼b60077332▼h8▼s2▼fP
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